Identifying the origins of a Distributed Denial-ofService (DDoS) attack is among the hardest research topics in the Internet security area, due to the stateless nature of IP networks and to the confusing and dffising effect of DDoS attacks. In this paper, we select ten essential factors to analyze a newly-designed Dos-resistant ICMP messaging scheme and demonstrate its feasibility, effectiveness, security, and iminunity to Denial-ofiservice (DOS) attacks.
Introduction
A Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack is designed to render a computer or network incapable of providing normal service to legitimate users. DDoS (Distributed DOS) attacks employ many computers to launch a coordinated DOS attack, which produces and sends attack packets from hundreds of different networks or IP addresses rather than just one. IP traceback is a technique attempting to identify the origin of a specific IP packet. In the last few years, researchers have proposed various IP traceback mechanisms such as: link testing [7] , logging [3] , overlay networking [4] , deterministic packet marking [ 141, probabilistic packet marking [1,2,10,1 I], and ICMP messaging [5, 6] . However, most of them [1,2,5,6,7,10,11] and our approach are actually designed for DOS attacks and are only feasible to trace DOS attacks because we assume that the victim or attack tracer should receive a large number of packets from attack sources when it's under siege. Even though each approach has solved some essential IP traceback difficulties, sometimes they also introduce new problems. For instance, the route reference approach [7] does not require ISPs to participate in the traceback process, but in fact, originates a new DOS attack on its own network. Theoretically, the SPIE [3] can achieve the ultimate goal of the IP traceback -the single-packet IP Traceback -and reduce the storage requirement significantly, but the overhead is still considerable, particularly for routers in the core of the Internet. The CenterTrack [4] lessens the number of hops required for traceback, but the approach needs to cooperate with other ISPs in order to continue the traceback across network boundaries. In addition, although probabilistic packet marking methods [ 1,2,10,11] successfully eliminate all bandwidth and storage overheads on network equipment, the path construction process at the victim has become too complex to accomplish accurately and in a timely manner. The ICMP traceback scheme (iTrace) [5, 6] reduces the computation complexity, but also increases overall network traffic. Therefore, we consider the following requirements for our IP traceback scheme:
1. Incremental deployment. Due to the cost and time required for upgrading network equipment, it is not practical to assume that most equipment can be updated with new hardware or software promptly. Therefore, incremental deployment is essential to all pragmatic new designs.
2. Workload equilibrium. Some network equipment, particular those devices at the core of the Internet, is time-sensitive and incapable of performing additional functionalities; hence, new designs should draw on edges routers rather than core routers.
3. Security. One of the most common problems of all proposed mechanisms is the mark or message authentication; but only one method [2] explicitly consider cryptographic algorithms to verify the marks or information, since those algorithms are relatively expensive.
4. Robustness. Savage et al.'s PPM [I] seems to be the most elegant IP traceback scheme because routers continue to be stateless and the sizes of the marked packets remain unchanged. However, due to very limited available space in the IP packet header, the PPM breaks information into pieces, but that causesvery high rate of false positives for path reconstruct1 5. Bandwidth overhead. For most methods, a cri' 1' issue is whether or not extra traffic load consume: significant bandwidth. However, without sufficient 0-7803-8623-W04/$20.00 02004 IEEE space for adding information to IP packet headers, producing extra messages seems inevitable, but the number of additional messages for IP traceback should be restricted 6. Computational overhead. Except for the authenticating process, the most significant computational overhead is the attack path construction process, which needs to gather and assemble scattered information in considerable numbers of packets or messages received by the victim or trace agents.
7. Storage overhead. Besides the SPIE storing information at forwarding routers, the PPM and the iTrace also consume a lot of memory space at the victim or trace agents, which collect and store information for later path reconstruction.
8. Dos-resistance. Ironically, although IP traceback mechanisms are designed to defend against (identify the sources of) DoS/DDoS attacks, most of them suffer from DoS/DDoS attacks as well because they do not prevent information from tampering with and they need to consume resources, such as network bandwidth, computation power, and memory space, even when no attack is involved [8] .
This paper will demonstrate how the ICMP Caddie Messages scheme (Caddie) fulfills these properties. In Section 2, we summarize the iCaddie scheme. Section 3 discusses its IP traceback model and describes the traceback procedures. We evaluate the scheme in Section 4, and conclude in Section 6.
ICMP Caddie Messages
The ICMP Caddie Messages (iCaddie) [12] is a newly-proposed ICMP messages scheme that provides a DOS-resistant solution for various network security issues. A Caddie message is an extra ICMP message generated by a router, called the Caddie initiator, attached with the entire packet routing history of one randomly selected packet, called the Ball packet, forwarded by the router. In other words, while a router is forwarding packets, it randomly selects one of the packets as a ball packet, and then generates a Caddie message following the ball packet. The Caddie message will collect the path information about the sequence of the router's identities along the way toward the ball packet's destination. Accordingly, the destination can construct a traffic source tree structure by simply composing the Caddie travel paths inscribed in the Caddie messages received. (Figure 1 ). When a host receives an abnormal number of Caddie messages from some sources, the network administer should consider initiating an attack path construction process to identify the sources.
IP Traceback
Concerning traditional DDoS attacks, the direct DDoS attacks, an attack arranges to send out a large number of attack packets from many compromised attack agents directly towards a victim. Because Caddie messages will collect the routers' IDS or IP addresses passing through along the way from the Caddie initiator to the destination, the victim can construct a tree diagram that illustrates the sources of Caddie messages, which indicate the IP addresses of attack agents.
Packet Travel Path Construction
The iCaddie employs a Bloom filter to eliminate duplicate Caddie travel paths and reduce the storage requirement for the Caddie destination. The Bloom filter computes k different path digests for each path using independent uniform hash functions, and then uses the n-bit results to index into a 2n-sized bit array. The array is initialized to all zeros, and indicated bits are set to one as Caddie messages are received. The duplicate Caddie travel path can be detected by computing the k digests on the ROUTER LIST element of the Caddie message and by checking the indicated bit position. If any one of them is zero, the path is not on the traffic source tree, and it can be added onto the tree. Eventually, each Caddie destination can construct a traffic source tree, which indicates all the travel paths of Caddie messages received. However, network administrators are really interested in the sources of some abnormal aggregates, which is a collection of packets from one or more flows that have some properties in common. For example, while suffering from a DOS attack, the attack victim intends to resolve the sources of high volume aggregates. Therefore, the victim can employ the least recently-used (LRU) page replacement algorithm to remain the useful traffic paths and also to limit its own the storage requirement, because we assume the attack victim should receive a huge amount of attack packets from attack agents or attack reflectors during a DDoS attack.
Dos-Resistance
Statistically, network bandwidth, system memory and computer CPU are the most common targets of DOS attacks today, due to the limited resources. The iCaddie intentionally reduces the requirements of network bandwidth, computation power, and memory storage to defend against DOS attacks [8] . For example, the iCaddie employs the Caddie timer to reduce the number of ICMP messages that will be generated and the TRKC algorithm' [2] to authenticate information and reduce the requirements of secret key generation and clock synchronization. The storage requirements for each router are limited to a fixed-size Caddie keymaker and one Caddie timer on each port, which are independent of the number of attackers, victims and attack packets. In addition, the path construction of the iCaddie is straightforward. Furthermore, because the TRKC secret keys and HMACs can be pre-produced and reused, the computation overhead is still manageable even though the iCaddie supports message authentication.
Evaluations
To demonstrate the feasibility of the Caddie, we have selected ten essential factors for comparison and evaluation. Our evaluation is based on the contribution of previously published papers [2, 9] and on mathematical analysis.
Scalability
Whether or not a mechanism is scalable depends on the requirement for reconfiguration of existing devices when a new device is added into the group. Like most probabilistic packet marking [1,2,5,6,10,11] and logging methods [ 3 ] , the configuration of an iCaddie router is totally independent of any other router. Therefore, the Caddie is scalable and easy to expand. Conversely, overlay networking methods [4] require reconfiguring existing networks and cooperating with other ISPs and are not quite extendable.
Incremental Deployment
Incremental deployment ability means that even though a mechanism is only partially deployed, the method still can provide meaningful results. In addition, when the number of devices is upgraded with new mechanisms, the results will be more accurate. Theoretically, all proposed IP traceback methods support incremental deployment. Unfortunately, the partial deployment also significantly increases the complexity of path construction for most methods except the iCaddie, whose Complexity is independent of the deployment rate.
The iCaddie looks like an overlay network (Figure  l) , but it does not need to reconfigure routers or reroute packets. For example, non-participating routers simply forward Caddie messages as normal ICMP messages based on the destination IP addresses, and that depends on the next featured router to continue the marking process. Accordingly, it's possible that some RIDS are missing in the RL field. Fortunately, as the number of participating routers increases, the possibility of missing router identities or losing Caddie messages will decrease accordingly. 
Workload Distribution
For the probabilistic packet marking and logging methods, if all routers use the same probability to mark [ 1,2], generate [5, 6] , or stoie [3] packets, large portion of the workload for marking, generating, and storing packets will be centralized at the routers of the Internet core, because the core routers have a much higher traffic load than edge or local routers. For example, the number of ICMP traceback messages generated toward a specific destination by a router with the distance d away from the sources has the following expectations:
where n is the number of packet targeting on the destination for each source; p is the ICMP selecting probability of each router; s is the number of upstream routers for each router, and d is the distance from the source to the router. According to (l), it's not desirable for today's high-speed backbone routers since they have been overwhelmed by tremendous everyday traffic. Conversely, in the case of the iCaddie, a router will only create an ICMP Caddie message if it has not received an ICMP Caddie message from upstream routers for a specific period of time. This means that, in contrast to other marking or logging methods, the workload at the core routers is even slightly lower than at the edge routers because they usually receive ICMP Caddie messages from edge routers and then simply update and propagate the messages, instead of generating new ICMP messages. Therefore, the number of ICMP Caddie messages generated toward a specific destination has the following expected values:
Accordingly, routers close to edge routers (2) create more Caddie messages. Figure 2 illustrates the workload distribution for the iTrace and the iCaddie based on the distance from the source. Furthermore, edge routers that are not on the attack paths have a low traffic load and will create only few Caddie messages, in which the attack victims are not interested and which will be omitted by the Caddie destinations. Basically, the most expensive computation for the iCaddie is the HMAC calculation, because when a router adds a new element into the ROUTER LIST of a Caddie message, it must calculate the corresponding HMAC as well. Fortunately, HMAC computation is very efficient [2] , and the contents of HMAC inputs for Caddie propagators are actually stable. For example, the router ID is constant, and the upstream and downstream router IDS are predicable. Even the timestamps and secret keys do not have to change frequently due to the TRKC algorithm [2] . So the most mutable one is the packet digest. Conversely, Caddie initiators need to recalculate HMAC on all header fields each time and sign each message twice [12] . Therefore, Caddie initiators actually consume more computation power than Caddie propagators, and that is the reason that the workloads of the core routers are even less than edge routers with regard to the Caddie.
Attack Packets Required for IP Traceback
The number of attack packets required will influence the complexity and the accuracy of the path construction process, as well as the feasibility for tracing DDoS attacks. In general, all probabilistic packet marking (including ICMP messaging) and link testing methods assume that a certain number of attack packets will be produced from the same sources and sustained for a period of time. This means that they need a certain number of attack packets, based on individual packet selecting rates. Some grow exponentially by the path length. For example, the expected number of packets required to be generated by the attacker for the AAM is bounded by:
and for the iTrace is bounded by: However, the number for the iCaddie is independent of the length (Figure 3 ):
Messages Generated for IP Traceback
The number of messages generated indicates the possible bandwidth consumption by the mechanism. CenterTrack produces a tremendous amount of packets in order to congest and observe a specific network link. Compared to the in-band PPM methods, the most notable shortcoming of the iTrace is causing additional network traffic. For the iTrace mechanism, each router on the path from the source to the destination will create individual ICMP messages with a copy of the original packet and information about its adjacent routers to the destination. This means that the destination, at least, needs to receive d (=distance-1) iTrace messages to construct one path. Accordingly, the total bandwidth consumed is (Figure 10) Conversely, the overall number of ICMP message generated for the iCaddie depends on the number of traffic sources, rather than that of routers in the network. Therefore, there is only one ICMP message generated for each path ( Figure 5 ). In sum, it's not difficult to understand that the iTrace unintentionally creates ICMP messages, but the iCaddie intentionally updates Caddie messages received, similar to some inband probabilistic packet marking mechanisms [1,2,10,11]. 
Robustness
In order neither to increase the overall traffic nor to enlarge the original packet size, all packet marking methods [ 1,2,5,6,10,11] let routers probabilistically mark packets with partial path information. For instance, due to very limited available header space, Savage et al. [l] splits each router's IP address and needed information into eight fragments, causing a large number of false positives, while constructing the attack paths. Thus, Song et al. [2] assume that the attack tracer prepares a map of its upstream routers to reduce the false positives. The reason for producing those false positives is that the probability is relatively high of two packets in a large packet pool having the same short packet digest. Conversely, the iCaddie needs no topology knowledge about upstream routers and produces almost no false positives (Figure 6 ) because there is no need to assemble divided information and reconstruct a path.
Computational Overhead
All packet marking IP traceback algorithms have two components: 1) a marking procedure, executed by routers; 2) a path construction procedure, performed by trace agents or attack victims. Regarding the iCaddie, the marking process by routers is straightforward, and its complexity is similar to other marking methods. However, in the case of path construction, the packet marking information splitting is not only increase false positives, but also causes high computation overhead for the path construction process. The PPM [i] constructs candidate edges of a travel path by combining all combinations of fragments at each distance with disjoint offset values in the packet marking. The AAM [2] uses the upstream map as a road map to perform a breadth-first search from the root. Let Nd be the number of routers in the network at distance d from the attack tracer; nd be the number of routers in the road map at distance d from the attack tracer; and f be the number of fragments of each packet marking. The number of checksum tests for the PPM is N$, and that of HMAC tests for the AAM is nd.,Nd [2] . Because all the Caddie messages method has to do is count and append the path onto the tree; the complexity increases almost linearly (Figure 7 .) 
Conclusion
The storage overhead for the iCaddie is much less than for other IP traceback mechanisms. For example, each edge or core router requires only one timer and one fixed-sized cache for partial pre-computed HMACs at each input port. Unlike other probabilistic packet marking methods, the iCaddie merely needs a fixedsized cache to keep most recent traffic paths or paths with high volume of traffic at the victim or attack tracers.
Security Consideration
The authentication of the initialization of a Caddie message is dependent on the HMAC of the first element of the ROUTER LIST field, which is inscribed by the Caddie initiator; and each element of the ROUTER LIST field is authenticated by the corresponding HMAC field, protected by session keys of each forwarding router.
Theoretically, a compromised router can append a fake element in the ROUTER LIST fieId, drop Caddie messages, or even tamper with the list written by previous routers, but it cannot disguise itself as other routers or fake a valid element because it does not know the session keys of other routers at the time it's forwarding the Caddie message, nor make any change to fields inscribed by successive routers. Consequently, the victim can verify each HMAC from the end of the list and then work backwards until the first invalid element and ignore the rest of the list. Even though the session keys are reused by the TRKC, each HMAC will be different to prevent a potential replay attack, due to distinct DIGESTS and TIMESTAMPS. This means that an attack tracer can at least detect the closest compromised router. Regarding packet dropping attacks [ 131, Caddie propagators can send acknowledgements back to the Caddie initiator as well.
Administrative Issues
Some political issues make the defending and tracing process much more complicated. The most obvious and discussed difficulty is that some of the defensive measures and IP traceback mechanisms require the cooperation between the victim and the upstream ISP or among ISPs. In addition, legal implications should also be considered. For example, the SPIE, the PPM and the AAM hash packet payloads, as digests, might be controversial. However, an iCaddie digest includes only the packet header, which is considered legal and does not violate privacy.
In this paper, we analyze a new ICMP message -the ICMP Caddie messages scheme -which provides a simple and straightforward solution for IP Traceback. While the proposed scheme still needs some router modifications, the potential overhead on routers has been minimized. For example, our approach has very low network bandwidth and router storage overhead and supports incremental deployment. Compared to other methods, the Caddie messages scheme has higher precision and lower computation overhead. Particularly, it balances the workload in the network. Furthermore, the scheme cannot be the target of a DOS attack.
